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1. Introduction
Are physical events subject to mental influence? Even to raise the question
suggests what the answer had better be. Deny mental causation and you are de-
nying that anyone everdoesanything: answer a question or anything else.2 Tongues
may wag and arms may wave about, but there is no action unless these things
occur at the bidding of appropriate mental states. Nor is action the only casualty
if mental states are physically inert. Smirking, beaming, moping about, shivering
in anticipation, raising a skeptical eyebrow, favoring a tender limb—these are
just an inkling of the human phenomena making no sense in a world where thoughts
and feelings keep causally to themselves.
Of course, to say that mental states hadbetterbe physically influential does
not begin to explain how such a thing is possible. And the fact is that bafflement
about thehowof mental causation has been growing, to the point that doubts are
now creeping in about thewhether.Agood many philosophers seem ready to give
in to these doubts and accede to some form of epiphenomenalism: here, the view
that mental phenomena exert no causal influence over the course of physical
events. A good many others “resist” epiphenomenalism by maneuvers so subtle
that it is mainly on their own impassioned testimony that they are not counted into
the first camp. Still other philosophers would junk mental phenomena altogether
rather than see them causally enfeebled.
All of this adds up to what has been described as an outbreak ofepiphobia.
(Epiphobia5df the fear that one is turning into an epiphenomenalist.3) Even
allowing for the strange logic of thought disorders, it has to be said that this one
is asserting itself at rather a surprising historical moment. Epiphenomenalism
was supposed to be somebodyelse’sproblem: somebody long dead, or at any rate
hopelessly out of touch with recent materialist developments like multiple real-
ization and supervenience. Why epiphobia now?
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2. A Story
Time was when epiphobics had a genuine threat to point to: the gaping divide
dualists had postulated between the mental realm, said to be lacking in kinemat-
ical qualities, and the thoroughly kinematical physical realm. Not even Descartes
claimed to understand how causal relations were supposed to reach across this
divide,4 and his critics (notably Gassendi) found the notion positively incoherent:
you must explain to us how this “directing” of movement can occur without some
effort—and therefore motion—on your part. How can there be effort directed against
anything, or motion set up in it, unless there is mutual contact between what moves
and what is moved?5
Even at the time, however, such worries were easily shrugged off by philosophers
who, while agreeing with Descartes that the mind was something apart, had their
own ideas about its particular nature. (Gassendi is a case in point: “I will grant
you [that you are really distinct from your body], but will not therefore grant that
you are incorporeal...”6) Centuries of subsequent squabbling about the intelligi-
bility of cross-category interaction never quite succeeded in breaking this stale-
mate. No argument from the gaping ontic divide between mind and body could
get a grip, simply because no one felt sure of what the divide’s mental side looked
like.
Then the brainstorm hit that the mind’s precise characteristics might not
matter; trouble for mental causation could be conjured out of physical assump-
tions alone.7 Never mind whether mental causation is beyondu erstanding(that
depends on the natures of the relata, hence in particular on the nature of mind), it
is enough for the epiphenomenalist if it is beyondbelief. And that mental causa-
tion is beyond belief can be maintained just on the strength of the physical realm’s
well attested autonomy and self-sufficiency.Astrategy like this was employed by
C. D. Broad in his “argument from energy”
I will to move my arm, and it moves. If the volition has anything to do with causing
the movement we might expect energy to flow from my mind to my body. Thus the
energy of my body ought to receive a measurable increase, not accounted for by the
food that I eat and the oxygen that I breathe. But no such physically unaccountable
increases of bodily energy are found,8
and his “argument from the structure of the nervous system”
...the nervous processes involved in deliberate action do not differ in kind from those
involved in reflex action; they differ only in degree of complexity... .So it is unrea-
sonable to suppose that the mind has any more to do with causing deliberate actions
than it has to do with causing reflex actions.9
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But it was Norman Malcolm in “The Conceivability of Mechanism” who first
grasped the new genre’s full potential.Assuming a physical theory rich enough to
“provide sufficientcausal explanations of behavior,”
the movements of the man on the ladder would becompletelyaccounted for in terms
of electrical, chemical, and mechanical processes in his body. This would surely
imply that his desire or intention to retrieve his hat had nothing to do with his move-
ment up the ladder.10
The most important stimulus to contemporary epiphobia is this argument of Mal-
colm’s. Because it sees would-be mental causes as preempted by underlying phys-
ical states, we can call it theargument from below. Later it will be set out in more
detail but the essence is simply this: with each physical effect causally guaranteed
by its physical antecedents, what is there left for its mental antecedents to do?
Although the argument as stated targets mental causes, the underlying logic
applies toall nonphysical states. If an effect is causally inevitable given preexist-
ing physical conditions, then the effect’s biological, geological, economic, etc.
antecedents are just as much out of a job as its mental ones. Whether because of
concern about the sweepingness of this result or for some other reason, attention
has been shifting to a second and in some ways more discriminating argument,
theargument from within.
The target this time isintentionalmental states: states like belief and desire
individuated in terms of truth or satisfaction conditions. If Putnam is right that
truth conditions can vary between internally indiscernible agents (e.g., me and
my doppelganger on Twin Earth), then intentional states areextrinsic, or not
wholly a matter of what goes on within the thinker’s skin.11 Add to this that it is
intrinsic states that determine causal powers—
you can change [extrinsic states], remove them, or imagine them to be different in
various respects, without ever changing the causal powers of the object or person that
is in this extrinsic condition—
and you see the problem:
how can extrinsic facts aboutA, depending as they do on factors that are spatially
and temporally remote fromA, help explainA’s current behavior? Surely what
explains, causally explains,A’s raising her arm or pushing a button are intrinsic
facts aboutA.12
Any behavior that beliefs and desires mightseemto generate must really be due
to some intrinsic surrogate: syntactic states, perhaps, or narrowly contentful
attitude-analogues, or even brain states.13 Intentional causes are thus displaced by
factors internal to the agent, which gives the argument its name.
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3. The Connection
The key point for us is that mental causation faces two separate threats: “from
below” and “from within.” With so much effort gone into distinguishing these
threats in recent years,14no one seems to have noticed that they areconnected, and
in a way that makes them more formidable as a package than taken separately.Any
decent response to BELOW (as I’ll call it) will have to make use of the principle of
proportionality: causes must be proportional to their effects.
But, WITHIN can claim to be little more than an application of the very same
principle! If that is right then we are damned if we do (accept proportionality) and
damned if we don’t; either way, one of the two arguments goes through. How
proportionality is supposed to play this double role is the topic of the next few
sections, but in general terms the idea is this.
Start with the physical states that BELOW casts as preempters. Seen in the
light of proportionality, these appear to be overloaded with unneeded microstruc-
tural detail. (Had my pain been implemented in a different microphysical way,
the effect would in all likelihood still have occurred.)As for the mental states they
are said to preempt, these are simply the result of stripping some of the unneeded
detail away. But then to call the mental state an unneeded excrescence gets mat-
ters exactly backwards. You might as well say that since my screaming “wake up
right now!!” in my cat’s ear sufficed to wake him, my screaming in his ear as such
made no contribution; it was only along for the ride.
All right so far. But now WITHIN chimes in that intentional “causes” are
alsooverloaded with unneeded detail, not microstructural this time butxtrinsic.
Regardless of whether my desire had been for water or twater, as long as I stayed
intrinsically the same the behavioral results would not have been any different.
The question is, why should this excess extrinsic detail be any less offensive to
proportionality than the unneeded microstructural detail of the last paragraph?
This is a question I hope to answer. After various preliminaries and softening
up exercises in the next few sections, the argument will unfold in three stages.
First, WITHIN isnotan application of the same principle used to defeat BELOW.
Second, BELOW falls to a principle that istolerant of intentional causation,
albeit intentional causation of an interestingly unexpected sort. Third, WITHIN
relies on an enormouslystrongerprinciple that undermines just about any intu-
itive causal relation you care to mention. Details will be given in due course; for
now proportionality is left at an intuitive level so as to give WITHIN the best
possible run for its money.
4. The Argument from Below15
According toclosure, each physical outcomeE is causally guaranteed by
some prior physicalC.16 Dualismsays that no mentalC* is identical to any phys-
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ical C. Exclusionsays that ifE is causally guaranteed byC, then noC* distinct
from C is causally relevant toE. These three assumptions granted, no physical
effect owes anything to its mental antecedents. How can it, with underlying phys-
ical states already ensuring that the effect is going to occur?17
All of the assumptions could be quarreled with, but closure and dualism can
be considered the price of admission to the debate. Someone who denies dualism
(e.g.) thinks that mental statesare physical states and so is not interested in any
supposed threat from below. It makes sense then to focus on exclusion, which has
in any case an obvious problem. Look again at what is being claimed:
for every “form of nonidentity”R (every irreflexive relation) and every
R-related pairC andC*, if C is causally sufficient for an effect thenC* is
causally irrelevant to it.
No doubt there aresomeirreflexive relationsR whose relata do compete for
causal influence as the principle says. But for manyRs this competition arises
only sometimes, and for others it never arises.R 5 causation is a case in point;
taken at its word, the exclusion principle predicts thatE owes nothing to the
causal intermediaries by whichC bringsE about! This shows that the exclusion
principle is overdrawn. But is it overdrawn in a way that bears on the causal
relevance of my pain? How plausible is it really that my pain serves as a causal
intermediary between its physical basisC and my grimace?
Never mind that this would require my pain to be literally aneffectof C,
whereas pain intuitively stands in acloser than causal relation to its physical
basis.18 The relation pain bears toC is, as the word “basis” attests, often thought
to be causal-ike; it is considered a dependency relation of some sort.19 And
that ought to be just as good. The real difficulty is still to come. Much as we
might like the idea of our thoughts and feelings functioning as intermediaries,
how exactly are they supposed to be slotted in? If there were gaps in the phys-
ical event-chains linking brain states to behaviors, then (who knows?) mental
states might perhaps find work plugging them. This would violate the exclu-
sion principle but only in the way that intermediaries do generally. To foist my
pain on a process that is complete and self-sufficient without it, though, goes
against what seemsright in exclusion: a thing can do causal work only when
causal work is there to be done.
5. Dependence
A lot of people seem to think that the best way of getting mental states in on
the causal act is to make them strongly enough dependent on physical states.
(Supervenient dependence is particularly recommended in this regard.) But a
dependent is ontologicallyposteriorto what it depends on, and so all the depen-
dency hypothesis achieves is to cast my pain as a lagging indicator of the fact that
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a process causally sufficient for the effect is already under way. T. H. Huxley saw
this implication already in the last century and did not flinch from it:
all states of consciousness...are immediately caused by molecular changes of the
brain-substance...our mental conditions are simply the symbols in consciousness of
the changes which take place automatically in the organism...the feeling we call vo-
lition is not the cause of a voluntary act, but the symbol of that state of the brain which
is the immediate cause of that act.20
Those of us who do flinch from Huxley’s conclusion have our work cut out for us.
If mental states do notdependon “molecular changes of the brain-substance,”
how are they connected to brain activity? What alternative picture of mental/
physical relations is available?
Of course, one clear alternative is mapped out by the identity theory. There is
no question on this theory of pain’sdependingon (brain state)C, for C is already
a state of pain. Another thing there is no question of on this theory isC’s beating
pain to the causal punch. It is only in the matter of truth value that the theory
disappoints. Identicals necessitate one another, but any state specific enough to
necessitate pain (a condition we assumeC to meet) istoo specific to be necessi-
tated by it in return.C is thus one of a number of brain statesCi each necessitating
pain asymmetrically.21
No surprises so far. The surprise is that an essentially similar picture, in
which (certain) brain states arealreadystates of pain, continues to be available
even if the identity theory is rejected. An analogy shows how this can be. Just as
pain is not identical to any of the brain statesCi that necessitate it, red is not
identical to any of the more precise shadesRi (scarlet, crimson, etc.) that neces-
sitateit. Yet there is no question of rednessdependingon scarlet, for to be scarlet
is already to be red. Scarlet is, as we say, aw y of being red, or, in an older
terminology, adeterminateof redness. Why shouldn’t theCis likewise be dete-
rminates of pain?22
At last we have hit on a relation that brain states plausibly bear to mental
ones23 andthat makes nonsense of the causal competition idea. Imagine a pigeon
Sophie trained to peck at red shapes. No one would call the triangle’sredness
irrelevant to her pecking on the grounds that the effect was already provided for
by its specificshadeof red.24 Nor would anyone think that my screaming as such
was irrelevant since my screaming “wake up!!” was sufficient. Examples like
these confirm what seems obvious anyway: determinates do not preempt their
determinables.25 Understand pain as a determinable of theCis, and preemption
should not be possible in this case either.
6. Determinables and Causation
The argument from below rests everything on a certain principle: a sufficient
cause drains whatever it bearsR to of causal relevance. But the principle is not
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true whenR 5 the determinate/determinable relation. Since this is a relation in
which physical and mental states plausibly stand, my painc n (for all anyway
that BELOW has to say about it) be relevant to effects for which my brain state
suffices.
To stop here though leaves the impression of a power sharing arrangement
between pain and brain state—an arrangement, indeed, favoring the brain state,
since it after allsufficesfor an effect to which the pain claims only some unspec-
ified relevance.
One could try to counter this impression by enlarging on what has already
been said, viz. that to be in pain ispart of what it isto be in such and such a brain
state. When one state is included in another, any influence that the first has on
subsequent events is included in the influence had by the second. Brain state and
pain thus share power in a more literal sense than the one intended: not by divid-
ing it up between themselves, in the way that books share space on a shelf with
other books, but by possessing it in common, in the way that an encyclopedia
shares shelf space with the volumes making it up.
And yet built into this account of how the two statessharepower appears to
be a concession that the brain state hasmorepower. (Just as the encyclopedia fills
more space.) This greater power shows up quantitatively in the fact that my brain
state bears the most powerful form of causation—causal sufficiency—tomore
effectsthan my pain. And it shows up qualitatively in the fact that each of these
extra events (e.g., say, my grimace) ismore the effectof my brain state than of my
pain. Because again, it is the brain state that stands to the grimace in the most
powerful form of the causal relation there is.
I say that two distinct notions of “effectiveness” are being run together here,
in a way we need the principle of proportionality to help us sort out. There is no
denying that my brain state has the quantitative advantage mentioned. But suf-
ficing for moreeffects is one thing, greater license to claim them asyoureffects,
another. And proportionality says that my brain state may well be in aworse
position to cause some of these additional effects than is my pain.
How we confused ourselves was by thinking of sufficiency and relevance as
unequally powerful forms of causation, when in truth they are not forms of cau-
sation at all.X can berelevantto Ydespite omitting factors crucially important to
Y’s occurrence (my addressing the cat was relevant to its waking) andsufficient
for Ydespite incorporating any number of irrelevant extras (its waking was caus-
ally guaranteed by my shrieking in its pointier ear at a prime number of decibels
a message with the semantic content that it should immediately wake up). ButX
does notcause Yunless it isproportionalto it, in a sense that at least implies some
degree of freedom from these excesses.26
If causation is subject to a proportionality constraint, what does that say
about my brain state’s claim to be more the cause of my grimace than its mental
competitor? Arguably it is the brain state, weighed down with superfluous mi-
crophysical detail, that suffers in the comparison. After all, I would still have
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grimaced even if my pain had occurred in a different microphysical way. Whereas
the issue of how I would have behaved had the brain state occurred in the pain’s
absence cannot even be raised, because the brain state includes the pain.
7. The Argument from Within
This is where WITHIN sees its opening. I desire water and extend my hand.
But of course Twin Me, who desires not water but twater, would have done the
samein my circumstances27—as indeed wouldanyoneintrinsically just like me,
even a Swampelganger Me with no intentional states whatever. So intentional
states, like brain states, are overloaded with unneeded detail. The only difference
is that this time the unneeded detail is “without” rather than “below.”
If beliefs, desires, and the like do not cause behavior, what does? The only
remaining candidates would seem to be intrinsic states of some sort: syntactical
in nature, or neural, or narrow analogues of the attitudes. But we know from the
Twin Earth examples that states like these do notof themselvesrepresent the
world as being any particular way. (What theycanperhaps claim is association
with a staggering array of different truth-conditions, which depending on the
causal/historical context in which they are imagined to be embedded; see section
11. But context aside, the intrinsic counterpart of my belief that water is wet no
more concerns H20 than XYZ, and no more these than a pattern of electrical
signals emanating from the walls of some brain-ready vat.) And now we see the
real threat posed by WITHIN: the part of our mental life with the strongest intu-
itive claim to influence behavior—the partrepresentingthe circumstances which
that behavior seeks to change, and the outcomes it seeks to bring about—may
have to take a back seat to states with limited or nonexistent representational
powers.
8. A Nomic Analogue
Notice a way in which this reasoning stops curiously short. Fixated as we
become on the causally excessive aspects ofintentionalstates, and determined to
find relief in intrinsic surrogates, it never occurs to us to ask whether the intrinsic
surrogates might not be excessive in their own way.28 I want to sneak up on this
question by switching temporarily (until section 13) to anomicversion of the
argument.
Imagine that we are asked to find the cause of someone’s receiving a speed-
ing ticket near a police radar unit; in a familiar jargon, we are asked to solve “X
caused her to be ticketed” forX. Bearing in mind proportionality’s call for anX
that isenoughfor the effect without beingtoo much, we quickly see that there are
two opposite ways of bungling the task, illustrated by
(1) her driving through the radar caused her to be ticketed, and
(2) her speeding through the radar sober caused her to be ticketed.
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respectively.Herdriving through the radarwasnotenough,sinceshehad tobedriv-
ing over the speed limit, while her speeding through the radar sober was too much,
since her sobriety had nothing to do with it. The true cause will be an event that lies
somewhere between the two, presumably her speeding through the radarper se.
Now let the task be to solve “Xs ceteris paribus conduct electricity” forX—to
find a nomic ancestor rather than a causal one.Again there seem to be two roughly
opposite ways of going wrong. This time let our examples be
(3) matter c.p. conducts electricity, and
(4) pennies c.p. conduct electricity.
Because lots of matterdoesn’tconduct electricity, including some paradigmatic
enough not to be scared off by the ceteris paribus clause, (3) has anunderspecific
antecedent, making it anovergeneralization. (4) has the opposite problem; cop-
per conducts electricity regardless, so (4) is anundergeneralization with anover-
specific antecedent.
This suggests that laws too observe a kind of proportionality constraint. For
it to be a law thatAs are c.p.Bs,A should be determinate enough to make (other
things equal) forB, but that’s all; there should be no piling on of nomically
irrelevant detail. Otherwise we run the risk of breaking unitary generalizations up
into a large number of pointlessly different variants: “pennies conduct electrici-
ty,” “copper foil conducts electricity,” “the bottoms of RevereWare pans conduct
electricity,” and so on.
Isn’t nomically irrelevant detail just what we are getting, though, in inten-
tional generalizations like “people who want water c.p. go ahead and drink”?Any
behavior issuing frommyintentional states issues equally from the very different
intentional states of my otherworldly Twins. Set against the intrinsic properties
they and I share, that it iswater I want looks like precisely the sort of nomic
irrelevancy that proportionality warns against. Ignoring this warning amounts to
turning our back on a great mass of unitary causal generalizations, namely all
those entailed by the fact that doppelgangers behaveidenticallydespite believing
and desiring different things.
That was the promised nomic analogue of WITHIN. No one could object to
the principle behind it; carving up unitary generalizations is a bad thing. But if it
is bad when the generalizations are over Twins, then it is bad whatever they are
over. At a minimum, then, the argument is too quick. Nothing can be concluded
until we consider whatothergeneralizations might be on the chopping block; and
whether it was the Twin generalizations that put them there; and which should be
sacrificed if we are forced to choose.
9. Missed Generalizations
A fact that tends to get lost in all the excitement about our Twins is thatwe
have no Twins. Neither here on Earth nor anywhere in darkest space can molecule
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for molecule duplicates of flesh and blood human beings be found. As an imme-
diate consequence, the forgone generalizations of the last paragraph (which say
in effect that anyone intrinsically just like SY is in his circumstances going to do
just as he does) are generalizations over thingsall but one of which fail to exist.
This may not make the generalizations any less true, but neither does it recom-
mend them as crashingly important.29 Still less does it recommend them as crash-
ingly more important than the generalizations we forgo if we insist on intrinsic
typing—especially since these latter range over things a great many of whichdo
exist.
I am about to drink some water, and something tells me I’m not the only one.
Is there anything about the members of this group to set us apart from the general
run of others? The tempting reply is thatweare the ones whowantsome water.30
Pretending for argument’s sake that soda, coffee, whiskey, and the rest are yet to
be developed, so that water is the one and only drinkable, we can put the relevant
law like this:
(5) people who want water c.p. have a drink.
But now notice something important about the world’s water-wanters. Once we
get beyond their shared extrinsic property of being in a state with waterish sat-
isfaction conditions, they are an exceedingly miscellaneous bunch. Unprincipled
disjunctions aside, any intrinsic feature they possess in common is likely to be
shared as well by a good manyon-water-wanters.31 If we insist on intrinsic
typing nevertheless, the unitary generalization (5) breaks up into a jillion varia-
tions on the theme of
(6) people intrinsically just like SY c.p. have a drink.
And why should decoupling me from my Twins, who after all don’t exist, be
thought worse than decoupling me from my drinking buddies, who after all do?
Stop right there, you say—“generalizations entailed by the fact that doppel-
gangers behave identically” wasn’t supposed to mean generalizationslimited to
doppelgangers, but rather generalizationssubsumingdoppelgangers; the plea in
other words was not on behalf of (6) but something more like
(7) people in intrinsic stateF c.p. have a drink,
whereF is some limited shareableaspectof SY’s total intrinsic state. So, contrary
to the last paragraph, the generalizations we forgo by typing intentionally, and
incur by typing intrinsically, haveplentyof real world instances. Add to this that
(7) improves on (5) in extending to these instances’ counterfactual doppel-
gangers, and the verdict is clear.
Some such line of response is the intrinsicalist’s best bet. But it overlooks
one thing: only (6) can be described as a generalizationentailedby the fact that
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doppelgangers behave identically in the same circumstances.32 What we have in
(7) is theformof a generalization that the intrinsicalisthopesfor. Generalizations
like this may well exist, but only if it proves possible to pare my total intrinsic
state down to a part that, while specific enough to make c.p. for drinking, is not
sospecific as to be peculiar to myself. And the fact that doppelgangers behave
identically cannot itself decide this issue—at least, not by any argument that we
have yet seen.
10. Bracketing
To think of (7) as acasualtyof intentional typing is premature; all that it
represents so far is a lost opportunity. And yet, it is possible to wonder how there
canfail to be interesting (7)-type generalizations. Aren’t these guaranteed, more
or less, by the existence of (5)-type intentional generalizations, together with the
fact that how people behave in a given situation depends only on what they are
like intrinsically? If it is true, for instance, that
(5) people who want water c.p. have a drink,
then given the irrelevance to this behavior of their purely extrinsic features, it
should also be true that
(8) people who [want water] c.p. have a drink—
where [wanting water] is wanting water with its purely extrinsic aspects bracketed
away.33 This amounts in fact to arecipefor intrinsicalizing intentional general-
izations like (5). Simply substitute for each offendingattitudethe corresponding
battitude, that is, its image under the operation of bracketing.34
Sounds promising, but why stop there? If the recipe works at all, it gives a
way of intrinsicalizing nonintentional generalizations as well: substitute for each
offendingG the corresponding [G]. I have heard, for example, that people from
large families are by and large gregarious. But gregariousness in a given context
depends on intrinsic features alone; a gregarious person’s intrinsic duplicates are
not going to be taciturn and withdrawn. Apparently then there has got to be an
intrinsic property of [being from a large family]—the intrinsic “core” of being
from a large family—thatalso makes c.p. for gregariousness. Again, the poor
must share an intrinsic property of [poverty] that accounts for their feelings of not
having enough food in their stomachs. And now the fallacy must be plain. The
most that follows from the irrelevance of the purely extrinsic is that each water-
wanter hassome intrinsic feature or otherthat leads c.p. to drinking. The further




How wishful it is can be seen by looking at the two maintheoriesof the
battitudes. One gives us states that are shared but not sufficiently specific, the
other, states that are specific but not shared.
The simpler of the two theories says that you share my [belief thatp] iff some
possible doppelganger of yours believes thatp.35 (Similarly for desire and the
other attitudes.) Twin Me on Twin Earth [wants water], for instance, since he has
a doppelganger, myself, who wants water. Doppelgangers of other terrestrial water-
wanters [want water] too, not only on Twin Earth but on all planets, be they actual
or hypothetical.
But it is not just doppelgangers elsewhere of terrestrial water-wanters who
[want water]. Doppelgangers here of extraterrestrial water-wanters [want water]
too. And now it becomes hard to think who doesnot [want water] on this theory.
For let Dino be a person wanting essentially any old thing.36And let Twin Dino be
Dino’s doppelganger in a world where the-thing-that-manifests-itself-in-the-way-
that-the-object-of-Dino’s-desire-actually-manifests-itself iswater. Twin Dino
wants water inthat world, so Dino [wants water] in this one. Battitudes as ex-
plained by the first theory are thus wildlyunderspecific, turning “people [want-
ing water] c.p. have a drink” into a grossovergeneralization along the lines of
“matter conducts electricity.”
Why does the theory deliver such coarse-grained results? Reformulate it like
so and the reasons jump out: you and I share a battitude iffthere areworldly
contexts,not necessarily identical, in which your doppelganger judges the same
proposition as mine. Each of the highlighted phrases makes for a separate kind of
trouble. “Not necessarily identical” leaves the door open totailoring the two
contexts so as to offset bona fide battitudinal differences. Perhaps Dino is a mar-
tini fiend would sooner chew tinfoil than take in a drop of any other liquid, but the
fact that he (or rather, his doppelganger)wouldwant water in a world where it was
water that lay behind martini-appearances suffices to make him a [water-wanter]
like me.
All right; we need to drop the “not necessarily identical” and require that the
same proposition be judgedin the same context. That we are free to choose this
context at will (due to the existential quantifier “there are”) means that a problem
remains. Battitudes that arecapableof latching onto different propositions are
absolutely distinct.37 But acapability is not the sort of thing that every context
can be relied on to register. Sargon’s [longing to visit the Morning Star] was quite
a different battitude from his [longing to visit the Evening Star], even if he lived
out his days in a setting where their distinctness did not manifest itself in different
propositional outcomes desired.
Where are we? Not only should battitudinalizers be compared in the same
context, that context should be allowed to vary arbitrarily. Both of these modifi-
cations together give us the second main theory of the battitudes.38 For someone
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to share my [belief thatp], their doppelganger inw should believe (not the prop-
ositionp that I in fact believe, as on the first theory but) the propositionp(w) that
my doppelganger inw believes.39 And this should hold not for a single worldw
(as on the first theory) but all of them.40 Put another way, battitudes are individ-
uated by the functions they induce from worldly contexts to the singular propo-
sitions that get judged in those contexts.
Not just anyone is going to share my [belief thatp] on the new approach.
They are going to have to grasp or conceivep at leastsomewhatas I do, lest the
difference induce a different proposition believed in some faraway world. But
how much similarity of conception are we talking about here? All it takes for a
thinkernot to share my [belief thatp], remember, is that there besomethingin
their take on reality, no matter how little connected top, that in some worldw,
however distant or contrived, swings the propositional content of their belief
away from that of my doppelganger inw. It is natural to wonder whether there is
anydifference in [attitude] that could not be exploited to achieve this result in a
suitably wacky world.
Here is why. What my [belief thatp] is about in a worldw depends on what
it is in covariational thrall to there. But on anybody’s account, the covariational
channels through which content flows are shaped and sustained by various sorts
of external props: paradigms, measuring devices, experts, and the like. No doubt
there are worlds in which all available props converge on the same external ref-
erent; all the instruments agree as it were. But there will also be worlds in which
switching the prop puts the thinker en rapport with adifferentreferent.Any change
in [attitude] with even thepotentialto shift my allegiances as between props thus
engenders anactualchange in the function from contexts to attitudes that con-
stitutes my [belief thatp]. And it is hard to think how a change in [attitude] could
lack this potential—how I could “change my mind” withoutin any circumstances
whatevertipping the balance in favor of deference to a different class of para-
digms, measuring devices, experts, or what have you. Variation in any [attitude]
therefore entails variation in all of them.41
This problem for the second theory of the battitudes can be calledsubjec-
tive meltdown. Because what we are seeing is that to share my [belief thatp],
you must share my total subjective outlook—or, what comes to the same, my
[belief that p] is my total subjective outlook.42 If there is anything to subjec-
tive meltdown at all, the second theory essentially just inverts the difficulties
we found with the first; it deliversoverspecific battitudes, turning “[water-
wanters] c.p. drink” into anundergeneralization along the lines of “pennies con-
duct electricity.”
12. Battitudes as Overcommittal Anyway
Now for the “real” reason not to take it for granted that proportionality backs
the battitudes over the attitudes. This is a reason that continues to apply even if
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subjective meltdown is somehow avoided—even if battitudes are the separately
identifiable cognitively revealing items their proponents have wanted them to be.
Imagine that to each of my attitudesA corresponds a distinct subjective state
[A]SY that sums up what I within the privacy of my own head to be inA.43 So,
[desire for water]SYis what I do internally todesire water(as opposed to what I do
to desire fried green tomatoes or to believe that okra is slimy). The state thus
picked outmightbe a hankering after the odorless, tasteless, transparent, river-
filling stuff that etc. etc. But it might equally well be some sort of syntactical
and/or neural state.
The point in either case is the same. The appeal to these states can exempt the
intrinsicalist from charges of fracturing the intentional generalization (5) only on
a certain condition: all or almost all water-wanters must be in the state of [want-
ing water]S for some value ofS. And this is just not plausible. How a person’s
water-desire is neurally implemented, the precise mentalese orthography in-
volved, the fine detail of the water’s internal mode of presentation, all of these
may be expected to vary enormously without much effect (ceteris paribus) on the
desirer’s probability of drinking.
13. Back to WITHIN
A case can thus be made that WITHIN’s nomic analogue is guilty of double
dealing. After much handwringing about intentional states’ overspecificity rela-
tive to this or that intrinsic surrogate, that the surrogate states are similarly over-
specific relative to their intentional originals is completely overlooked. The
question is how much of this transfers over to WITHIN itself, which you’ll recall
goes as follows: According to the proportionality principle, causes should not be
overloaded with unneeded detail—detail in whose absence the effect would still
have occurred. But unneeded detail is exactly what we are getting when my desire
for water is nominated as the cause of my hand going out to the cup. Had it been
twaterI wanted rather than water, then, holding my [desire] fixed, my hand would
still have gone out.
Now, it might well be asked why (in the absence of information about how I
cameby my altered desire) this counterfactual should strike us as correct rather
than merely baffling. But our problem is much more basic. Assume that my [de-
sire] does screen off my desire in the way described. This can’t itself put my
[desire] in the driver’s seat, for my desire might well return the favor. Even if it
is true, in other words, that
(9) had my desire been different, then provided my [desire] had been the
same, my hand would still have gone out,
it might alsobe the case that
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(10) had my [desire] been different, then provided my desire had been the
same, my hand would still have gone out.44
And since (9) and (10) are absolutely symmetrical, any causal advantage the one
might seem to confer on my [desire] is nullified by the other.
14. Symmetry
At least, my [desire]’s advantage is nullified if (10) istrue. The intrinsicalist
will say that it is not. Don’t we have a million Frege-inspired examples to show
that tiny differences in the way a proposition is presented can have enormous
behavioral ramifications? Whereas if different propositions are presented in the
sameway (as in the Twin Earth examples), the same behavior results. The clear
lesson of these examples is that behavior is driven less bywhat one believes/
desires—by the propositional content of one’s attitude—than by how that con-
tent is grasped.And if so then the very last thing we would expect is that switching
the [desire] behind my desire, as in (10), will leave my behavior in place.
Sorry, but theclear lesson of the Frege and Twin Earth examples is only this.
If we distinguish “what I believe/desire” from “how I believe/desire it” as factors
in my extending my hand, then adjusting the how-factor alonecan affect my
behavior while adjusting the what-factor alonecannot. And this is compatible
with (10), as an example brings out.
Whenever Isaac spots his bubbe in a photograph, he grins in recognition.
Distinguish two factors in the grin on his face right now:hat the photograph
depicts (its subject or subjects, in this case my mother), andhow it depicts (how
intrinsically speaking the colors are arrayed). These two factors interact in some-
thing very like the way under discussion. Adjusting the how-factor alonecan
affect Isaac’s behavior—had the photograph been much fuzzier Isaac would have
been baffled by it—while adjusting the what-factor alone cannot—leave the col-
ors alone, and regardless of subject, Isaac grins. Shouldn’t we then conclude that
Isaac’s behavior is controlled more by the picture’s intrinsic color properties than
by its extrinsic, representational, ones? And if it is controlled more by the color
properties, then the very last thing we would expect is that adifferentlycolored
picture of his bubbe would still have lead Isaac to grin.45
And yet, this ispreciselywhat we would expect. Isaac is a boy capable of
tracking his bubbe through a huge variety of photographic images, and the image
at issue here is not anything special or strange but the one his bubbewouldhave
given rise to if the actual image were for some reason ruled out. Why Isaac should
suddenly lose sight of his bubbe in the alternative-image world nearest to this one
is hard to understand. Harping on the fact that a change in intrinsic color prop-
erties is necessary and, if suitably dramatic, sufficient for a change in Isaac’s
reaction only drives the problem home; why should there be adramaticchange in
color properties in thenearestalternative-image world to actuality?
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Here is what the Frege and Twin Earth cases may indeed show: if you want
to stop me from extending my hand, mucking with my [water-desire] alone can
do it, whereas mucking with my water-desire alone cannot. But this is fully com-
patible with saying that many or most ways of mucking with my [desire] leave my
behavior in place, provided that I keep on wanting water. And it is supremely
compatible with the notion that I would still have extended my hand if I had
wanted water in the way involving the least possible departure from actuality.46
So what, in other words, if a desire for water conceived as the-stuff-I-once-
saw-through-an-electron-microscope, or as whatever-she’s-drinking, would not
have set my hand in motion? The screening off issue concerns notthesemodes of
presentation but the one(s) Iwouldhave enjoyed had I not conceived of water in
the way that I in fact do. (Given the richness and multifacetedness of my actual
conception of water, it would seem bizarre for there to be no closer alternative to
my actual conception of water than one robbing my desire of its motive power.)
So what if a sufficiently perverse mentalese encoding would have cut my desire
off from its behavioral effects, as long as the closest alternative encoding(s) are
not perverse?
15. Proportionality
Generalizing madly, let us assert the following: any intrinsic state rich and
complex enough to count as what-I-do-internally-to-judge-that-p is bound to ex-
ceed in some respects the causal requirements of any particular bit of behavior. If
that is right, then the intrinsic causes that WITHIN favors are as open to charges
of disproportionality as the extrinsic, intentional, causes that it rejects. Either the
charges stand up in both cases—in which casenothingcauses behavior—or they
stand up inneithercase. I say that they stand up in neither case. But then there
must something wrong with WITHIN’s understanding of proportionality.
What could it be? Proportionality has been kept at an intuitive level until
now, mainly in order not to rain prematurely on WITHIN’s claim to be relying on
the same principle used in the response to BELOW. Suppose we look at that
response again, this time with an eye to what it has in mind by proportionality:
my brain state cannot expose my pain as causally irrelevant to my grimace,
because it is a determinate of my pain; my pain, however, can knock my brain
state out of contention for the role of cause, by screening it off and so exhib-
iting it as not required for, and hence out of proportion with, my grimace.
Working backwards, my brain state is not proportional to my grimace because it
is not required; and it is not required because my pain—one of its determinables,
note—screens it off. Here are the definitions right way around:47
(11) C1 screens C2 off from Eiff, had C1 occurred withoutC2, E would still
have occurred.
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(12) C is required for Eiff none of its determinables screens it off, andC is
enough for Eiff it screens off all of its determinates.48
(13) C is proportional to Eiff it is both required by and enough forE.49
To complete the response we should explain how my pain, having knocked my
brain state out of contention for the role of cause, might come to occupy that role
itself. If it were to screen off itsotherdeterminates (other than the brain state, that
is), then by (12), my pain would beenoughfor the grimace. If it escaped a similar
fate at the hands of its determinables, then by (12) again, it would berequired.
Both results together would by (13) make my painproportional to the grimace
and to that extent its cause.
16. Thick and Thin
Here is what proportionality means in the response to BELOW: you are
proportional iff you screen off your determinates, and you avoid being screened
off by your determinables. The question is whether WITHIN can get by on the
same interpretation. Does the fact that attitudeA is screened off from a behavioral
effect by battitude [A] knock A out of proportion with that effectin the sense of
proportionality just laid down?
That depends on how we resolve an unremarked ambiguity in talk of atti-
tudes likeA. ThatA is extrinsic is agreed (remember Putnam and Twin Earth). But
an extrinsic state need not be extrinsic through and through; it can have intrinsic
parts or aspects. This is obvious in the case of rigged-up examples likebe ng
spherical and P, whereP is a property as extrinsic as you like. But there are
plenty of ordinary examples as well. Being a horse (stamp, crater, ... .) involves a
horsy historytogether witha horsy intrinsic character. Even that paradigm of
extrinsicness, the property of being five miles from a burning barn, is not alto-
gether free of intrinsic content. To be five miles from anything you need spatial
boundaries, and it seems an intrinsic property of a thing that, along some dimen-
sions at least, it finally peters out.
Now, from the Twin Earth examples we know thatA is extrinsic in respect
of its truth-conditions or singular propositional content.50 But this does not pre-
vent it from being intrinsic in other respects. One possibility is thatA includes
the thinker’s internal contribution to the fact that such and such is the truth-
conditional content she judges; that is,A might be adeterminateof [A] 5 its
image under the bracketing operation. Attitudes like this, which have their cor-
responding battitudes as determinables, will be calledthick. Another possibility
is thatA is (relatively) noncommittal about the thinker’s internal contribution; it
is not a determinate of [A]. Attitudes like this will be calledthin.51
How does the thick/thin distinction affect [A]’s ability to knock A out of
proportion with behavioral effects? Simple—thickA has [A] as a determinable,
and (11)-(13) say thatA had better not be screened off by any of its determinables
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if it wants to come out proportional toE. A is not proportional toE, then, if it is
screened off by [A]. (Compare: my screaming “wake up!!” in my cat’s ear is not
proportional to its waking up if it is screened off by my screaming in the cat’s ear
as such.) Whether screening off in fact occurs depends on the details of the
case—on whetherE would still have occurred had the thinker judged a different
proposition by way of the same battitude. But if the factors responsible for the
switch in proposition are far enough removed from the causal scene, thenE is
probably not going to be affected.
About thickattitudes, then, WITHIN has a point; they reallyare in danger of
being knocked out of proportion with typical behavioral effects by their intrinsic
counterparts. But if you have been following me this far, you will see thatt in
attitudes are in no comparable danger. This is because thinA as no intrinsic
determinables worth speaking of—certainly not [A], for A does not determine
[A] 52—and it takes a determinable ofA to expose it as not required for the effect.
Thin attitudes have nothing to fear from WITHIN.
17. Superproportionality
If a determinableof Cscreens it off, thenC is not required forE. But, why the
restriction to determinables? What is so special about them that only they have
the power to breakC’s causal connection withE? This is crucial because extend-
ing equivalent veto power tonon-determinables would bring thinA under the
same proportionality pressure as thick.53 And if thin A loses its advantage over
thick, then not much remains of our defense of wide causation.
So again, what is so special aboutC’s determinables? And while we’re at it,
what is so special about its determinates thatC need only screenthemoff to be
proportional toE?
Nothing, you might say. The fact thatC is screened off at all shows that, other
things holding fixed, the effect would still have occurred without it. And even a
single state not screened off byC shows thatC cannot itself supply all of the
effect’s causal needs. What is the point of a proportionality condition if not to
show “causes” like this the door? Never mind the ineffectual (12) and (13); let’s
have
(14)C is superrequired forE iff nothingscreens it off, andsuperenough for
E iff there isnothingit fails to screen off54
and
(15)C issuperproportional toE iff C is superrequired and superenough forE,
Bertrand Russell seems to have been in the grip of some such idea in “On the
Notion of Cause.” Because here is what he argued, or provided the materials for
arguing:
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Ccannot cause a strictly later eventEexcept via some causal intermediaryD.
But thenC is not superenough forE, since it would not have been followed
by E but forD’s assistance.55 (Nor is it superrequired, since givenD it makes
no difference toE whetherC occurs or not.) So there can be no temporal gap
between cause and effect. Can we at least say thatC beginsearlier thanE,
ending at (or after) the time at whichE begins? No, for the parts ofC occur-
ring prior toE would have to be written out as not superrequired.56 The only
true causation is simultaneous causation.57
So much for the old canard about the future being causally beholden to the past.
By the time Russell is done the universe has disintegrated into a loose succession
of moments, each sponsoring feverish causal activity on a rigidly intramural basis.
Now, Russell intended his argument as a reductio of the whole notion of
cause. But it works better as a reductio of (13)’s overheated conception of pro-
portionality. The real lesson of Russell’s argument is that to insist that causes
screen off subsequent events, while not being screened off by them in return,
imposes an absurd degree of intimacy on causal relations. This perhaps explains
why no one has ever tried to deduce epiphenomenalism from the fact that mental
states are screened off by the causal chains they extend towards behavior. If this
sort of screening off were truly disqualifying, epiphenomenalism would be the
least of our problems; essentiallyeverythingwould be robbed of its intuitive
causal powers.
No one imagines it makes beliefs and desires epiphenomenal to be screened
off by events subsequent to themselves. But manydoseem to think it makes them
epiphenomenal that they are screened off by associated [beliefs] and [desires].
This is interesting because it seems to me that to countthis sort of screening off
disqualifyingalso imposes a disastrous degree of intimacy on causal relations.58
The difference is that now the intimacy is of a modal nature rather than a temporal
one. Instead of being forced to exist at the same times,CandEare forced to occur
at the same or similar worlds.
18. Dedicated Pseudocauses
Why a modal intimacy this time? Because it is primarily in modal respects
that attitudes differ from their corresponding battitudes. As far asthis world is
concerned, my desire for water and my [desire for water] are just alike. They
occur at the same time and, Putnam’s slogan that “meanings ain’t in the head”
notwithstanding, in the same place. (He might as well have said that pennies ain’t
in the pocket, since events within the pocket do not suffice to make thempen-
nies.) To the extent that content is categorical, they can even be said to have the
same content or contents.All of their categorical properties are shared, or near
enough not to matter. Where my desire and my [desire] differ is in which of these
properties they have essentially, or, what comes to the same, in their counterfac-
tual careers. The desire persists into worlds where it iswater that I want, even
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water grasped in a different intrinsic way; the [desire] persists into worlds where
it is thuslythat I want, even if the thing thusly wanted is not water.
Using the termcoincidentfor items that are categorically alike but hypothet-
ically different, we can put the claim like this. Applied to events occurring at
different times, superproportionality imposed an undue degree of temporal inti-
macy; applied to coincident events (events occurring at the same time but in
different worlds) it imposes an undue degree of modal intimacy.59 Epiphenome-
nalism is the least of our problems either way, because too much intimacy of
either sort makes an absolute hash of the causal order.
A few sections back we saw how coincident would-be causes can screen one
another off; in the terms of (14), each exposes the other as not superrequired for
the effect. That was just the tip of the iceberg, however.Another scenario involves
three candidate causes, all coincident, with the first screening off the second,
the second screening off the third, and the third screening off the first. (Had the
miller girl guessed the little man’s name without guessing “Rumpelstiltskin”—
his name was “Ralph”—or guessed “Rumpelstiltskin” without guessing his deep-
est secret—he had a stilldeepersecret—or guessed his deepest secret without
guessing his name—“Rumpelstiltskin” was nothisname but that of his invisible
friend—he wouldstill have stamped himself into the ground.60) Again, none of
the candidate causes is superproportional with the effect. How often does this sort
of situation arise?
Here are some crude statistics to suggest what the superproportionalist is up
against. IfC1, ... ,Cn are coincident events each up for the role of causingE, then
Ci causesE, according to superproportionality, only if
for all Cj , E would still have occurred hadCi occurred inCj’s absence, and
for all Cj , E would not have occurred hadCj occurred inCi’s absence.
Call the scenario wherenoneof theCis passes this test—where each has its can-
didacy destroyed by some other—collective self-destruction. What we are after is
an estimate of its probability. As a basis for calculation let’s say that between the
hypothesis thatE wouldhave occurred hadCj occurred withoutCi , and the hy-
pothesis that itwouldn’thave occurred, there is nothing to choose; one candidate
cause is a priori as likely to screen another off as not to do so. (This is debatable
but never mind; any other estimate only increases the chances of collective self-
destruction.) Then the probability ofCi’s escaping elimination at the hands ofCi
is 1/4—for there is half a chance of its being screened off byCj and half a chance
of its failing to screenCj off. Assuming that these probabilities are relevantly
independent,61 we can reason as follows:
the chance ofCi escaping elimination byCj 5 1/4, so
the chance ofCi escaping elimination altogether5 (1/4)n21, so
the chance ofCi being eliminated5 12(1/4)n21, so
the chance of eachCi being eliminated5 (12(1/4)n21)n.
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This is not a negligible figure, even for small values ofn. With two candidate
causes, self-destruction is 56% likely; with three it is 82% likely; with four it is
94% likely; and with five it is 98% likely. With six candidate causes there is only
one chance in a hundred that someCi will stave off elimination.62
It is true that the “right” candidate cause could beat the odds. But think what
“right” has to mean here.ACi which occurred in the very same worlds asEwould
not be in any danger. But any departure from this ideal is potentially a departure
from superproportionality. ForE to occur without benefit ofCi in even a single
world w opensCi up to charges of not being superrequired forE. (What it would
take to make the charges stick is aCj such thatw 5 the closest world to actuality
in which Cj occurs inCi’s absence.) Likewise a single world in whichCi occurs
withoutEopensCi up to charges of not being superenough forE. (Here we would
need aCj such thatw 5 the closest world in whichCi occurs inCi’s absence.)
Superproportionality comes perilously close to the demand that causes be uncon-
ditionally necessary and sufficient for their effects—as close as the pool of can-
didate causes permits.63
Pressurizing causes to exist in the same worlds as their effects is a bad idea.
ThatE is not likely tohavean antecedent quite this modally attuned to it is only
part of the problem. Even if such an antecedent were found, call itCe, we would
be hard put to regard it asE’s cause.After all, this would be an event with existence-
conditions roughly as follows:E’s causal needs are somehow or other met. Surely
it is not E’s causal needs being met that does the causing, it’s the whatever-it-is
that in fact meets them.
Imagine though that we stifle our doubts and acceptCe as cause; then our
troubles are just begun. An event so closely identified withE is in a poor position
to causeothereffects, especially if causation requires the high degree of modal
attunement now being contemplated. (Do not suppose that it will cause these
other effects viaE. Ordinary events likeE have long since fallen out of super-
proportion with their supposed progeny.) And howCe is supposed to be provided
with a superproportional cause of its own is anybody’s guess.64Any comfort that
superproportionality might seem to lend epiphenomenalism is thus a sideshow
compared to its real project. The world we have now is a richly connected cos-
mos, run through with multiply branching causal chains. Given the right sort of
ammunition (the right pool of candidate causes) superproportionality would lay
waste to this arrangement, leaving behind a great disorderly mass of effects each
tracing back to an unmoved mover dedicated precisely to it.65
19. BELOW vs. WITHIN
About one thing WITHIN is right: intentional causes incorporate unneeded
detail. Butall intuitive causes, intentional or not, are like this. Do we really want
to deny that the miller girl’s guessing “Rumpelstiltskin” caused the little man to
stamp himself into the ground, on the basis that so long as she had guessedhis
name(whatever it happened to be) the result would have been the same? If so then
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we are well on the way to a world of dedicated pseudocauses consisting inwhat-
ever it takesfor a given effect to eventuate.
Now this, coming on the heels of our objection to brain states as incorporat-
ing unneeded microphysical detail, may seem to raise double dealing to new
heights. Intentional causes can do it, but neural ones cannot—is that it? But there
is an objective difference here.C incorporates unneeded detail iff it incorporates
detail that (as I keep on saying) the effect could have done without,suitable other
things holding fixed. Focus with me for a moment on these “suitable other things,”
the ones in whose continued presence the effect would still have occurred. Are
they includedin C, or do they lie outside it?
If the suitable other things are included inC, then theyremain when the
unneeded detail is stripped away. Stripping that detail away therefore yields a
determinableof C that would still have been succeeded by the effect even inC’s
absence. This is how it is with my brain state and my pain.
Now suppose that the suitable other things arenot included inC, as whenC
is a thin attitude and what gets held fixed is [C]. Then the result of stripping the
unneeded detail away (unneeded extrinsic detail in the case of interest) is too
impoverished to do meaningful causal work.66 Thissort of unneeded detail will
have to be tolerated, because there is nothing to cover for it in its absence.
The point not to lose sight of is that there is no hope of evading the diffi-
culty by attempting tocompensatethe cause somehow for its extrinsic losses.
This can only push the bulge elsewhere, because apart from the whatever-it-takes
pseudocauses rejected above,all causes, even purely intrinsic ones, contain an
element of the unneeded. Tradeoffs are unavoidable; we buy relief from one sort
of unneeded detail by taking on detail of another sort. When the tradeoffs balance
out, we can attribute the effect to a relatively extrinsic cause or a relatively in-
trinsic one as we choose.67 When a modicum of extrinsic detail buys up an abun-
dance of intrinsic, we have wide causation pure and simple.
20. Innocence
If we could but recover our pre-Fregean intentional innocence, it would seem
incredible that the desire leading me to reach just now for water had much more
to its content than this: I get water.68What normally and primarily drives behavior
is outwardly directed attitudes, not how those attitudes happen to be encoded in
people’s heads.69
And a good thing too. Because think what life would be like if the same
truth-conditional contents, variously grasped, induced a comparable variety of
behaviors. Frustrating, that’s what. The more behaviors a fixed set of attitudes
issues in, the harder it becomes for these behaviors to converge on desired results.
How is it that people are so good at getting what they want?70 Three gener-
alizations go a long way towards accounting for this. First, people have a ten-
dency to do the subjectively reasonable thing, as defined by their [desires] and
[beliefs]. (Decision theory is not a complete descriptive failure.) Second, the sub-
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jectively reasonable thing is quite often theobjectivelyreasonable thing, in a sense
defined by the agent’s desires and beliefs. (Lois Lane snubbing Clark Kent, whom
shede readores, is the exception that proves the rule; it piques our interest because
it doesn’t usually happen.) Third, the objectively reasonable action is quite often
the objectivelyright action, in a sense given by the agent’s desires and the world.
(Facts relevant to the success of our behavior are generally known to us.)
Imagine that we were the sort of creature that was liable to be driven hither
and thither by variation in [desire] and [belief], even with all relevant desires and
beliefs held fixed. Then the second of the three generalizations would be under-
mined. According to it, the subjectively reasonable action (the one that typically
gets performed, remember) tends to be the objectively reasonable action. But
how is it possible for these actions to remain the same when the one is changing
with each shift in [attitude] and the other is staying put? Sensitivity to pure vari-
ation in [attitude] hurts our chances of doing the objectively reasonable thing, and
hence of doing the objectively right thing, and hence of obtaining satisfaction.71
21. Conclusion
Nourished from earliest days on a one-sided diet of Frege examples, and
impressed by the vast causal difference a slight shift in subjective conception can
make, philosophers have assumed that the richer intentional states are in subjec-
tive detail, the better adapted they are to the causation of behavior.
But (as one might have guessed from the fact that it took a Frege to think
them up) Frege examples arespecial. What ordinarily happens is that the agent
could have grasped her proposition in anyumberof ways at no cost to the
ensuing behavior. This and related oversights lead the standard view to reverse
the true state of affairs. The richer an intentional state is in subjective detail, the
more proportionality argues forrejectingit in favor of its subjective core.72 Better
equipped for causal duty are subjectivelyimpoverishedattitudes. These are safe
from WITHIN, and, stressing as they do the external situation grasped over sub-
jective nuances, more commensurate with typical behavioral effects. Normally I
reach for water because I wantwater, never mind the phenomenology.73
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the mind and spirit are constituted with a corporeal nature” (Long & Sedley 1987, 67).
7. Along, of course, with the assumption that mental phenomena aren’t physical. This
recalls another crucial stimulus to contemporary epiphobia, the Putnam/Fodor mul-
tiple realization argument. See their papers in Block 1980.
8. Broad 1925, 104. I should stress that he is not impressed by either argument.
9. Broad 1925, 100.
10. P. 133 of Watson 1982
11. Putnam 1975. Despite our perfect intrinsic similarity, my doppelganger on Twin Earth
wants twater, the colorless drinkable stuff in his environs, while it iswater that I
desire.
12. Dretske 1993, 187, with inessential deletions.
13. See various papers in Woodfield 1982, especially McGinn’s; Loar 1985; Stich 1978,
1980, 1983; Fodor 1980, 1987, 1991a, 1991c; Dretske 1988 and 1993; and various
papers in McLaughlin 1991, especially those by Kim and Horgan. Here is Kim’s
version of the argument: “semantical properties [are] relational, or extrinsic, whereas
we expect causative properties involved in behavior production to be nonrelational,
intrinsic properties of the organism. If inner states are implicated in behavior causa-
tion, it seems that all the causal work is done by their “syntactic” properties, leaving
their semantic properties causally idle... .How can extrinsic, relational properties be
causally efficacious in behavior production?” (1991, 55).
14. See in particular Kim 1991, Horgan 1991.
15. There is more on BELOW in Yablo 1992a; there it is called the exclusion argument.
16. Or at least sufficient forE’s objective probability.
17. E in this paper is always a token event. ButC, C* and so on can be either tokens or
types. Words like “state,” “phenomenon,” “antecedent,” and “event” are meant to
share in this ambiguity and as far as grammar permits they will be used indifferently
either way. (Although see note 47.) I appreciate that some people are scandalized by
type/token laxity and I apologize to each and every one of them. The alternative was
to run essentially the same argument twice over. See Yablo 1992a,b for a more careful
treatment.
18. John Searle says that mental states are “caused by and realized in” physical states of
the brain (1983, chapter 10).At times he even seems to suggest that they are caused by
andidentical tobrain states:
if brain processes cause consciousness, then it seems to many people that there
must be two different things, brain processes as causes, and conscious states as
effects, and this seems to imply dualism. This...mistake derives from a flawed
conception of causation (Searle 1995, 60).
Passages like this notwithstanding, Searlegreesthat there are “two different things”:
“the sheer qualitative feel of pain is a very different feature of the brain from the
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pattern of neuron firings that cause the pain” (ibid, 63). His view is thus type dualism;
mental types are caused by, realized in,a d distinct from, physical ones. Searle some-
times presents (this version of ) type dualism as a solution to the mental causation
problem; for many people it is where the problem starts.
19. Part of the reason that supervenience theories of mind met with such a euphoric re-
sponse was supervenience’s claim to
belong to that class of relations, including causation, that...represent ways in
which objects, properties, facts, events, and the like enter intodependencyrela-
tionships with one another (Kim 1993, 54).
Hence the disillusionment when it sunk in that the standard covariational definitions
of supervenience failed to capture any such dependency, and the subsequent insis-
tence that “any physicalist who believes in the reality of the mental must accept per-
vasive psychophysical property covariance...plusthe claim that a dependency relation
underlies this covariance” (Kim 1993, 169).
20. “Animal Automatism” in Huxley 1911, 244; the essay dates from 1874.
21. I have run this as an argument against type identity but it is effective against token
identity as well; see Yablo 1992a. Kripke inNaming and Necessitytakes a similar
position.
22. Admittedly, the pain/Ci : red/scarlet analogy isn’t perfect. This doesn’t concern me,
unlessthe disanalogies are such as to make pain more causally competitive withCi
than colors are with their shades. As far as I can see, all that “Y is a determinate ofX”
needsto mean in this paper is thatYnecessitatesX (not because it has a metaphysically
infallible way of bringingXabout but) becauseX is immanent in or included inY. This
is all it takes to kill the appearance of causal competition. To illustrate with a delib-
erately farfetched example, suppose that physical states turned out to beconjunctions
with mental states as conjuncts. Conjunctions are not in any traditional sense dete-
rminates of their conjuncts, but so what? They do determine them in the sense just
explained, and that is enough;P&Q can no more preemptP than scarlet can preempt
redness.
23. The determinate/determinable story is meant to apply to tokens as well as types; it is
not just pain as such but the particular pain I am experiencing right now that can be
had in a number of physical ways. Pain stands to its physical determinates in the
relation that red bears to scarlet; my particular pain stands toit physical determinates
in the relation that something’sturning red bears to its turning scarlet. See Yablo
1992a, section 6, for more on token determinates and determinables.
24. Not least because, for all that has been said so far, Sophie is shade-blind and can’t tell
crimson from any other sort of redness.
25. I am not saying that rednessinheritscausal relevance from scarlet; I am just denying
that scarlet candepriveredness of causal relevance.
26. Details are given in section 15.
27. There is a considerable tradition of attempting to answer WITHIN by denying this
sameness; my Twin, unlike me, would have been reaching fortwater. (See the first
few papers in Pettit & McDowell 1986, and for criticism Fodor 1991c.) I agree that
there issomethingmy Twin does that is different from what I do, and vice versa. But
I would hate to pin the case against WITHIN on this, for there is somethingelsewe do,
viz. simply reaching out, that is the same in both cases. I want to argue that WITHIN
is wrong even about the behaviors that my Twin and I have in common.
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28. Yablo 1992a is strangely complacent about this; see the “first remark” in that paper’s
note 51.
29. If the campaign to purge geology of extrinsic notions has never taken off, the reason
is that intrinsically-as-though-sedimentary rocks tend to be, well, sedimentary. No
one cares about the counterfactual generality thus gained.
30. Of course, it matters too that this desire is not outweighed by other desires, that water
is available, that its whereabouts are known, and so on; I’ll take all that for granted here.
31. “Oh? Who’s to say they don’t all have the same sentence of mentalese in their desire
box?” I have two responses. First, Fodor has promoted mentalese as providing a non-
Fregean explanation of cognitive significance phenomena. This application falls apart
if the relation between singular propositional contents and mentalese encodings is not
one-many. (Do not say that the relation is one-many just when cognitive significance
phenomena force it to be. This suggestion pulls in two directions at once, because a
given attitude will engender lots of behaviors onlysomeof which care how exactly the
attitude is encoded.) Second, the argument was supposed to show that narrow taxon-
omy was better, because less generalization-killing, than broad. Now it looks as though
narrow taxonomymight be less generalization-killing than broad; it is if a kind of
narrow taxonomy can be made out that kills fewer generalizations. Who could argue
with that?
32. Actually, not even (6) isentailedby this fact since I have intrinsic duplicates in a huge
(unlimited, in fact) range of external circumstances. Twin Me may be in circum-
stances like mine but he is very much the exception.
33. This argument is already a bit of a stretch, for a reason hinted at in the last note:
water-wanters may well find themselves in circumstances more favorable to drinking
behavior than the common run of [water-wanters]. But let me not distract attention
from the more serious worry raised in the text.
34. “Bracketing” makes it sound as though battitudes were stripped down attitudes. This
is true in the case of “thick” attitudes (section 16). But I want to leave the door open
to “thin” attitudes too subjectively impoverished for bracketing so understood to yield
anything worthwhile.
35. That is, some possible doppelganger of yours has a belief with the singular proposi-
tional content thatp. See Walker 1990 and Stich 1991. I am indebted to Brown 1993.
36. This is sloppy but not I think in a way that matters.
37. They are certainly distinct in the worlds where they exercise this capability; and if
there, then everywhere, for duplicates are battitudinally indiscernible.
38. See the first two chapters of White 1991 (one of which dates back to 1982) and Fodor
1987.
39. This papers over a real problem, namely, how to decidewhich of the propositions
believed by my doppelganger inw gets to count asp(w)—p(w) being the proposition
your doppelganger had better also believe inw f she wants to share my [belief thatp].
40. Or as many as makes sense; one doesn’thavedoppelgangers in every world. I’m
going to ignore this problem.
41. Here is Fodor:
what I use to manipulate the correlation between myelmthoughts and elms is not
an instrument but a botanist. To dothat sort of thing, I must be able to pursue
policies with respect to another person’s mind as well as my own. And also with
respect to the causal relations between our minds. I am relying on its being reli-
able that elms will cause the botanist to haveelm thoughts; which in turn will
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cause him to utter elm reports; which in turn will cause me to believe that it is an
elm I have to do with. Setting things up so that all thisis reliable requires that I
be very clever, that I know a lot (for example, I have to know which experts I can
trust) and that I be prepared to pay what a botanist’s services cost. But it is likely
to be worth the trouble (1994, 36).
Fodor says that I have to know which experts I can trust. Had myel thoughts been
under the control of different experts, they might have been correlated in the content-
determining way with a different kind of tree. But since who I trust aboutelm is a
function of collateral [attitudes], so iselm’s meaning in my neurolect.
42. Compare Block 1991’s arguments that narrow content is holistic and Fodor’s re-
sponse in the same volume. Fodor thinks that Block has confused two questions,
namely “what fixes the propositional content of mentalese token “X” in a given con-
text?” (answer: nomic relations with the outside world, regardless of relations with
collateral mental items) and “what in my mental life helps to sustain “X” in the rele-
vant nomic relations?” (answer: relations with collateral mental items among other
things):
the N-relation [“the nomological relation N such that your “X” tokens refers to
Xs...iff they bear N to Xs”] is...robust; many theories...might succeed in sustain-
ing the N-relation between ‘dogs’and dogs in this world, ‘dogs’and twin-dogs in
Twin-world, ‘dogs’and things-just-like-our-dogs-except-for-the-ears in Cousin-
world...and so forth. So, many different belief systems might implement the
narrow content DOG. Or, if this is not right, Block needs an argument to show
that it isn’t. And, so far, I don’t see that he’s got one (266).
The argument I would propose on Block’s behalf is that while different belief systems
will indeed implement the same N-relations insomeworlds, the “and so forth” is
unwarranted. Because the “and so forth” says in effect that differences in surrounding
theory arenecessarily(across all possible worlds ) incapable of bearing on what “dog”
is N-related to. And it is not clear how both of the following can be true together: first,
surrounding theory helps tosustain“dog” in its N-relations, but second, tweaking
surrounding theory not only does not butcannotaffect those N-relations. (Again, a
change of N-relations inanyworld entails a change of narrow contenthere.)
43. “Subjective” in the sense of “intrinsic to the subject.” This is to allow for syntactical
and/or neural battitudes. Note that we might want to relativize to other parameters as
well; the same person may judge the same proposition in different intrinsic ways at
different times, or even at the same time via different mental representations.
44. Compare Ruth Millikan: “Jerry Fodor has been considerably exercised (as he likes to
say) by the (undoubted) fact that, knowing only that it is trueof the girl next door that
John wants to meet her, we cannot predict that John will exhibit next-door-directed
behavior. For John may believe that this girl whom he wishes to meet languishes in
Latvia...But a very straightforward (though extremely fallible) surmise still follows
immediately from the fact that John desires to meet Jane...and from this factalone.
Namely, eventually Johnwill meet Jane (say, after he gets back from Latvia)” (1993,
69).
45. Cf. Walton’s claim that to see a person’s photograph is, or can be, to see the person
(Walton 1984). His concern iswhetherIsaac sees bubbe; mine iswhy he sees, or
seems to see, her.
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46. To say it a little more clearly: From (i) no change in behavior without a change in
battitude, that is, a purely attitudinal change won’t do it, and (ii) a purely battitu-
dinal changewill do it, it does not follow that (iii) attitudes cannot screen battitudes
off. (ii) is irrelevant to (iii) since whether my desire screens my [desire] off turns on
the results of holding my desire fixed while varying my [desire]—not the other way
around as in (ii). And between (i) and (iii) there is a palpable gap; what (i) saysc n
happen through pure variation in [desire], (iii) sayswould happenwere there pure
variation in [desire].
47. I have framed these definitions, and most of the subsequent discussion, with token
causation in mind. For the application to types, think ofC, with or without subscripts,
as qualifying an implicitly given token causeX, and substitute “X hasC” for “ C
occurs.”E remains a token effect.
48. I used to say thatCwas enough forE iff no determinate ofCwasrequiredfor E (Yablo
1992a,b). This was a weaker reading of enoughness since determinates ofC had only
to be screened off by some determinable or other, not necessarily byC itself. I now
prefer the definition in the text.
49. Yablo 1992a and 1992b put two further conditions on proportionality which can be
ignored here.E iscontingentonC iff it would not have occurred ifChad not occurred;
andC is adequatefor E iff had C not occurred,E would have occurred if it had.
50. These are different but not in a way that matters here.
51. “Attitude” in this paper has generally meant “thin attitude” and it will continue to do
so. Note that on the “thick” reading it would be (trivially) false to say that my desire
for water is more widely shared than my [desire for water].
52. Nor does [A] determine it; the two are just incomparable, like the property of being a
photo of Isaac’s bubbe and the property of being a photo with such and such intrinsic
color features.
53. Demonstrably so, since [S] screens off both if either. Proof: Because thinS’s differ-
ences from thick lie entirely within [S], [S] occurs without the one in the same worlds
as it occurs without the other. But thenE inhabits the nearest world containing [S]
without thickS iff it inhabits the nearest world containing [S] without thin S.
54. “Nothing” here means “no state or event actually in existence.” The mere fact that
therecouldhave been a state or event that, had it existed,wouldhave screenedC off
does not preventC from being superrequired.
55. “[T]here must be some finite lapse of time...between cause and effect. This, however,
at once raises insuperable difficulties. However short we make the interval ... some-
thing may happen during this interval which prevents the expected result. In order to
be sure of the expected result, we must know that there is nothing in the environment
to interfere with it. But this means that the supposed cause is not, by itself, adequate
to insure the effect” (Russell 1917, 136–7).
56. “[I]f the cause is a process involving change within itself, we shall require...causal
relations between its earlier and later parts; moreover it would seem that only the later
parts can be relevant to the effect...Thus we shall be led to diminish the duration of the
cause without limit, and however much we may diminish it, there will still remain an
earlier part, which might be altered without altering the effect, so that the true
cause...will not have been reached” (Russell 1917, 135).
57. That is, cause and effect mustbeginat the same time. Similar reasoning suggests that
they must end at the same time as well.
58. The “proportionality” principle laid down in the last paragraph ofYablo 1987 amounted
to (15) restricted to coincidents; I hereby withdraw it.
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59. Except of course when one of the coincidents is a determinate of the other; then we are
back to simple proportionality. The relation between (token) determination and co-
incidence is this.D is a determinate ofC iff (i) C inhabits every world thatD does, and
(ii) wherever both exist, they are coincident. Details can be found in Yablo 1987,
1992a,b.
60. To avoid any appearance of scope confusion, the claim is this. WhereC1 5 her guess-
ing the little man’s name,C2 5 her guessing “Rumpelstiltskin,” andC3 5 her guess-
ing his deepest secret, hadC1 occurred withoutC2, orC2 withoutC3, orC3 withoutC1,
the effectE would still have occurred. ThatC1 canoccur withoutC2 (etc.) shows that
we have not one event here but three, albeit threecoincidentevents (see Yablo 1987
and 1992b).
61. Assuming, that is, that (i) elimination at the hands of one candidate cause is indepen-
dent of elimination at the hands of another, and that (ii) one candidate cause’s being
eliminated is independent of another’s being eliminated. (ii) is not strictly true since
the hypothesis thatCi is eliminatedraisesthe chances that it was eliminated byCj ,
whichlowersthe chances thatCi eliminatesCj in return. (IfCj eliminatedCi by screen-
ing it off, then Ci cannot eliminateCj by failing to be screened off by it, and vice
versa.) The formula in the text is close enough to the truth not to matter.
62. If the power of elimination is reserved toCi’s determinates and determinables, chances
of self-destruction arezerountil the number of candidate causes hits four. And self-
destruction will always be rare, because of the following fact. Using, for the is-a-
determinable-of relation, and letting azigzagbe a sequence ofCis such thatC1 , C2 .
C3 , C4 . ... ., a set of candidate causes self-destructs only if each of its members is
connectable by a zigzag to a circular zigzag of cardinality four or more.
63. Ordinary proportionality raises similar problems (Yablo 1992b, section 11), but not on
anything like the same scale. Technically this is because the chances of finding aCj
screeningCi off (a Cj thatCi fails to screen off ) are greatly reduced if we requireCj to
exist in all (only) the worlds thatCi exists in. Intuitively it is because a determinate ofCi
that screens it off (a determinable ofCi that it fails to screen off ) is prima facie abetter
candidate thanCi for the role of cause. Superproportionality allowsCi to be killed off by
its causal inferiors; proportionality keepsCi alive until something better turns up.
64. This would be an event with the existence-conditions thatsomethinghas happened
given whichsomethinghas happened given whichE’s causal needs are met.
65. Compare Yablo 1992b, section 11. There may be room for a screening-off-type con-
dition stronger than proportionality but weaker than superproportionality. Several
people have suggested the following:C causesE only if C is not screened offasym-
metrically, that is, by anything that it does not screen off in return. This is helpful
when the candidate causes number exactly two but whenn 5 3 or more it becomes
possible for eachCi to asymmetrically screen off one of its fellows while being asym-
metrically screened off by another. The Rumpelstiltskin example is (or can be made to
be) a case in point.
66. Assuming that stripping it away yields an entity at all—there are questions here about
the limits of determinability.
67. Note that as long as neither determines the other,Ci andCj canbothbe proportional to
a given effect. (Which is good; see the discussion in Yablo 1992b, section 12, of
“world-driven” and “effect-driven” causes.) Superproportionality by contrast leaves
at most one candidate cause standing. (Suppose for contradiction thatCi andCj are
both superproportional withE. EitherCi screensCj off from E, or it doesn’t. In the first
case,Cj is not superrequired; in the second,Ci is not superenough.)
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68. This is a play on the last paragraph of Davidson’s “On Saying That”: “Since Frege,
philosophers have become hardened to the idea that content-sentences in talk about
propositional attitudes may strangely refer to such entities as intensions, propositions,
sentences, utterances, and inscriptions. ... If we could recover our pre-Fregean seman-
tic innocence, I think it would seem to us plainly incredible that the words ‘The Earth
moves,’uttered after the words ‘Galileo said that,’mean anything different, or refer to
anything else, than is their wont when they come in other environments” (1984, 108).
69. If I said that this followed from the fact that attitudes screen battitudes off, I would be
guilty of the very thing I’ve been warning against: drawing an asymmetrical conclu-
sion from symmetrical premises. (Battitudes screen attitudes off as well.) I can’t ap-
peal to proportionality considerations either, for there is nothing in the definition of
proportionality—as opposed to superproportionality—to prevent two candidate causes’
bothbeing proportional to an effect, provided that they are incomparable with respect
to determination. (See the second last note, and Yablo 1992a, section 12.) Then why
give the nod to the attitudes? Partly for shock value; partly because of skepticism
about the battitudes; partly because of the rationality argument to follow; and partly
because of a hard to defend intuitive feeling that that is the way the tradeoffs play
out—on the whole and for the most part, you can buy more intrinsic detail with a fixed
amount of extrinsic (truth-conditional) detail than the other way around.
70. I assume that “getting what you want” at least involves the referential content of your
desire coming true.
71. “But sensitivity to pure variation in [attitude] can work to our advantage. Julie’s [de-
sire to be with Jekyll] and [desirenot to be with Hyde] combine to put her in Jekyll’s
company in his high-functioning periods while keeping her out of his clutches when
he goes into monster mode. Hasn’t she gotten what she wanted?” Apparently so. This
kind of case needs further discussion. (Thanks here to Mark Crimmins.)
72. Using “subjective,” as above, for “intrinsic to the subject.”
73. And the orthography, and the neurology.
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